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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

In Re: )  
 ) No. 98-03294-W13  
BELINDA BARTON, )  
 )  
Debtors. ) MEMORANDUM DECISION RE:  
 ) OBJECTION TO FORD MOTOR  
 ) CREDIT COMPANY'S CLAIM  
 )

THIS MATTER came on for hearing before the Honorable Patricia C. Williams on March 14, 2000 upon the Debtor's Objection to creditor Ford Motor Credit Company's claim. The debtor was represented by John Campbell; creditor Ford Motor Credit Company was represented by Richard Hayden; and the Chapter 13 Trustee was represented by Joseph Harkrader. The court reviewed the files and records herein, heard argument of counsel and was fully advised in the premises. The court now enters its Memorandum Decision.

I.

FACTS

On May 27, 1998, Ms. Barton, the debtor, filed a Chapter 13 petition and a proposed plan. That original plan, and all amended plans, were served on the master mailing list which included Ford Motor Credit Company (hereinafter "Ford"). The original proposed plan listed Ford as a holder of a claim in the amount of \$16,036 secured by a 1997 Dodge Neon and listed \$16,500 as the value of collateral. The claim was to be paid at the rate of \$442 per

**FILED**

JUN 15 2000

T.S. MCGREGOR, CLERK  
U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

month.  
On July 1, 1998, Ford filed a Proof of Claim in the amount of

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**ENTERED**

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1 \$23,004.28 and designated the entire claim as secured. Attached  
2 were copies of the security documents on the 1997 Dodge Neon.

3 The debtor then filed a First Amended Plan on July 23, 1998  
4 which again identified Ford as the holder of a claim in the amount  
5 of \$16,036 secured by the vehicle with a value of \$16,500. The  
6 monthly payment to Ford under the plan was to be \$367. An  
7 objection to confirmation was filed by the Trustee on various  
8 grounds, including the "excessive" interest rate contained in the  
9 Ford Proof of Claim.

10 The debtor on October 27, 1998 then filed a Second Amended  
11 Plan again identifying Ford as having a claim of \$16,036 with the  
12 value of the vehicle at \$15,000 to be paid at \$367 per month. The  
13 Trustee objected to this plan as well, but Ford never filed an  
14 objection to any of the proposed plans.

15 The confirmation hearing occurred on December 13, 1998 and the  
16 Trustee and debtor's counsel appeared. At that hearing, the  
17 Trustee indicated that the Ford Proof of Claim appeared to be in a  
18 greater amount than should be allowed as it included pre-computed  
19 interest and other items. The Trustee indicated that the actual  
20 amount of the secured claim should be "clarified" but that if the  
21 plan were to pay Ford \$442.39 per month which was the regular  
22 contract payment, the plan would be feasible as the claim would be  
23 paid consistent with the filed Proof of Claim. The Second Amended  
24 Plan was then confirmed and the confirmation order specifically  
25 stated: ". . . Creditor Ford Motor Credit Company's allowed  
26 secured claim shall be paid at the rate of \$442.39 per month."

27 Debtor's counsel shortly thereafter left the practice of law  
28 and on January 5, 1999 her current counsel filed his Notice of

1 Appearance. On May 27, 1999, debtor's new counsel filed and served  
2 an Objection to Claim of Ford which specifically proposed to pay  
3 Ford a secured claim of \$8,500 as that was the value of the vehicle  
4 at the time of the petition. Ford objected on the basis that its  
5 allowed secured claim had been determined by confirmation of the  
6 plan.

7 II.

8 ISSUES

9 Essentially, Ford argues that any objection the debtor may  
10 have made to the amount of Ford's secured claim based on 11 U.S.C.  
11 § 506(a) which limits the secured claim to the value of the  
12 collateral had to be determined at the time of confirmation. Ford  
13 further argues that its filed Proof of Claim controls, i.e. that it  
14 has a secured claim of \$23,004.28 and due process requires more  
15 specific notice of any deviation from that claim than the plan  
16 confirmation process. In the alternative, Ford argues that since  
17 the debtor in her plan identified the collateral as having a value  
18 of \$15,000, *res judicata* and estoppel prevent her from five months  
19 later alleging that the value was \$8,500.

20 Debtor quite naturally disagrees with the creditor's  
21 perception of the situation. The debtor argues that the language  
22 of the court-required form Chapter 13 plan, which was utilized in  
23 this case, clearly precludes the plan from being *res judicata* as to  
24 the amount of a secured claim. The form plan states that the  
25 amount of an allowed secured claim is the amount contained in the  
26 Proof of Claim unless there is a separate motion filed to value the  
27 collateral or an objection to the claim. This provision for a  
28 separate motion, according to debtor, precludes *res judicata*.

1 Debtor also argues that the requirements of due process and  
2 applicable court rules have been met as the debtor filed an  
3 objection to claim specifically raising the issue of the value of  
4 the collateral.

5 III.

6 DISCUSSION

7 A. For Res Judicata Purposes, Is This Specific Chapter 13  
8 Plan a Final Determination of the Amount of an Allowed  
9 Secured Claim When the Filed Proof of Claim Contains a  
10 Different Amount?

11 Generally, a confirmed plan is *res judicata* as to all issues  
12 that could have been raised or litigated at the confirmation  
13 hearing. *In re Pardee*, 193 F.3d 1083 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999).

14 The principle of *res judicata* however must be applied  
15 consistent with relevant specific Bankruptcy Code and Rule  
16 provisions. Several specific Code sections and Bankruptcy Rules  
17 must be analyzed in addressing the issues raised by the parties.  
18 A court should interpret a statute so as to minimize discord among  
19 related provisions, and statutory provisions shall be interpreted  
20 in such a manner as to be consistent with one another. *In re*  
21 *Hobby*, 130 B.R. 318 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. BAP 1991); *Perlman v. Catapult*  
22 *Entertainment (In re Catapult Entertainment)*, 165 F.3d 747 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.  
23 1999). The same is true of court rules. Bankruptcy rules, even  
24 though merely procedural, have the force of law unless they  
25 directly violate a specific statutory provision. *Gardenhire v. IRS*  
26 *(In re Gardenhire)*, 209 F.3d 1145 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000).

27 Section 502(a) states that a proof of claim is deemed allowed  
28 unless a party in interest objects. However § 506(a) limits the  
amount of a secured claim to the value of the collateral. Applying

1 those statutory provisions to these facts, when Ford filed its  
2 proof claim in the amount of \$23,004.38 and designated the total  
3 amount as secured, presumptively, Ford's allowed secured claim was  
4 \$23,004.38. The debtor had the right under § 506(a) to object to  
5 that proof of claim on the basis that the value of the collateral  
6 was less than \$23,004.38. The debtor could not modify that filed  
7 claim by proposing and confirming a plan which paid a different  
8 amount.

9 F.R.B.P. 3007 requires an objection to a claim to be in  
10 writing and filed and served on the claimant 30 days before any  
11 hearing on the objection. The notice and hearing procedures for  
12 any such objection is statutorily mandated by § 502(b). An  
13 objection to a claim is a contested matter under F.R.B.P. 9014.  
14 *Garner v. Shier (In re Garner)*, 246 B.R. 617 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. BAP 2000).  
15 Both F.R.B.P. 9014 and 3007 require a separate pleading be served  
16 and filed with reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing.  
17 *Garner, supra*.

18 The language in the form Chapter 13 plan required to be used  
19 in this District is consistent with these statutes and rules which  
20 require an objection to claim to be a separate pleading and be  
21 resolved by notice and hearing.

22 To creditors whose secured claims will be paid within the  
23 term of the plan, each creditor shall retain its security  
24 interest/lien and be paid the amount of its secured claim  
25 plus interest from the date of petition filing as  
26 calculated by the trustee at the interest rate and  
27 monthly payment set forth below. The amount of a  
28 creditor's secured claim shall be the amount stated as  
secured on a proof of claim filed by or on behalf of the  
creditor unless the court determines a different amount  
following the filing of a separate motion to value the  
claim or the filing of an objection to the claim. . . .

28 Eastern District of Washington, Local Form, Chapter 13 Plan,  
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1 paragraph IIIA3(a).

2 Ford has the right to rely upon its proof of claim and if the  
3 debtor disagreed with that claim for any reason, the debtor had to  
4 file an objection to it. If the basis for the objection was that  
5 the value of the collateral was less than the obligation, thus  
6 reducing the secured claim under § 506(a), the debtor was required  
7 to so indicate and provide Ford with notice and hearing so that the  
8 issue of value could be determined by the court. Objections to  
9 claims must be raised in accordance with these statutes and rules  
10 which mandate pleadings separate and apart from any proposed plan.  
11 The Chapter 13 plan confirmation process simply does not meet all  
12 procedural and substantive safeguards collectively required by  
13 §§ 502(b), 506(a), F.R.B.P. 3007 and F.R.B.P. 9014 which apply to  
14 objections of claims. Any provision in a Chapter 13 plan which  
15 purports to modify a properly filed claim is not effective. It is  
16 not the correct procedure to do so. An objection to claim is a  
17 contested matter and places the appropriate parties on notice that  
18 litigation is required to resolve the dispute. The filing of a  
19 Chapter 13 plan does not initiate a contested matter and as  
20 F.R.B.P. 3015 requires in most instances that plans be filed with  
21 the petition, it is unlikely that creditors at that point have even  
22 contemplated filing proofs of claims. When the claim is filed pre-  
23 confirmation, the Code and the Rules impose on the debtor the  
24 burden of placing the claim in dispute by means of an objection to  
25 claim. *In re Simmons*, 765 F.2d 547 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985).

26 The *Pardee* decision, *supra*, does not indicate whether the  
27 student loan creditor had filed a proof of claim and does not  
28 address the relationship between *res judicata* principles and §

1 502(a). More importantly, the Pardee court reached its conclusion  
2 based upon the specific language of the plan under consideration.  
3 In the situation before this court, the specific language of the  
4 plan provides that the secured amount shall be " . . . the amount  
5 stated as secured on a proof of claim . . . ." Simply placing  
6 \$16,500 or some other number in the "Value of Collateral" column  
7 under paragraph IIIA3(a) of the plan does not abrogate the express  
8 language of the plan itself.

9 This Chapter 13 plan expressly states that the amount of a  
10 creditor's secured claim shall be the amount designated in the  
11 proof of claim absent objection to the claim. It necessarily  
12 follows that confirmation of this plan can have no *res judicata*  
13 effect on the issue of the amount due on a secured claim. This  
14 conclusion is consistent with the analysis of the concurring  
15 opinion in *Hobdy, supra*. As that concurring opinion states, the  
16 plan determines the payment stream which will be disbursed by a  
17 trustee to a claimant but is not binding as to the amount of the  
18 claim. *Hobdy* was also relied upon in *In re Moore*, 181 B.R. 522  
19 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995) which held that the value of the collateral  
20 set forth in the confirmed plan did not control. The confirmed  
21 plan had no *res judicata* effect as to the amount of the allowed  
22 secured claim.

23 **B. Was This Objection to Claim Untimely?**

24 The next question presented in this case is whether the debtor  
25 timely filed her objection to the Ford claim. Unfortunately, there  
26 is no statute or court rule which contains a deadline for filing  
27 objections to claims. Again, several statutes and rules must be  
28 analyzed to determine whether, when read as a whole, there is a

1 requirement that objections be filed before certain other acts can  
2 occur.

3 Ford argues that § 506(a) establishes a deadline for  
4 determining objections to claims based upon the value of  
5 collateral. Section 506(a) provides that when determining the  
6 amount of an allowed secured claim based upon the value of  
7 collateral that the value is to be determined ". . . in conjunction  
8 with any hearing . . . on a plan affecting such creditor's  
9 interest." Since a Chapter 13 plan affects a creditor's interest  
10 by establishing the payment stream to be received by that creditor  
11 from the Chapter 13 Trustee, Ford argues that the value of its  
12 collateral must be determined at the time of the confirmation  
13 hearing.

14 Interpreting § 506(a) as a deadline creates difficulties in  
15 the plan confirmation process and is inconsistent with other  
16 deadlines established in the Code. Congress could not have  
17 intended to impose a deadline for a hearing on the objection to  
18 claim earlier than the deadline to file the claim itself. F.R.B.P.  
19 3002 allows 90 days after the first date set for the § 341 meeting  
20 of creditors for the filing of a proof of claim. In many  
21 districts, confirmation hearings are routinely held prior to the  
22 claims bar date and this periodically occurs in this District.  
23 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that F.R.B.P. 3007 requires  
24 30 days notice of the hearing after the objection is filed.  
25 Chapter 13 plans are to be filed within 15 days after commencement  
26 of the case. F.R.B.P. 3015. Chapter 13 plans are confirmed  
27 expeditiously and delaying confirmation hearings until claims are  
28 due under F.R.B.P. 3002 plus the additional 30 days required by

1 F.R.B.P. 3007 would be contrary to that goal. Reading § 506(a) to  
2 impose a deadline for the filing of objections prior to the claims  
3 bar date would be a nonsensical result. If Congress had intended  
4 objections to claims to be filed prior to Chapter 13 plan  
5 confirmation, it would have been a simple matter to write such a  
6 deadline into the statute. More importantly, the language of §  
7 506(a), when read consistent with other provisions of the  
8 Bankruptcy Code, does not mandate the interpretation suggested by  
9 Ford.

10 A more careful reading of the language of § 506(a) does not  
11 lead to a conclusion that objections to claims based on the value  
12 of collateral must be determined at confirmation. As stated above,  
13 confirmation of a plan is not a determination of the amount of any  
14 allowed secured claim. Form plans in this District expressly  
15 provide that the amount of the secured claim, absent separate court  
16 determination, is the amount stated as secured in the proof of  
17 claim. The "creditor's interest" determined by the plan  
18 confirmation is the stream of payments to be received under the  
19 plan. As a plan cannot establish the value of the collateral, if  
20 the proposed payment stream is sufficient to satisfy the claim as  
21 filed, confirmation can occur whether or not an objection to the  
22 claim has been filed. The creditor's interest as it relates to the  
23 value of the collateral is not the issue during confirmation of a  
24 Chapter 13 plan.

25 A filed secured claim will be deemed allowed under § 502(a) if  
26 no objection has been filed. Based upon that filed claim, the  
27 proposed stream of payments in a particular plan under  
28 consideration may be less than the allowed amount of such claim.

1 This would prevent confirmation of the plan under § 1325(a)(5)(B).  
2 In such situation, the debtor would either have to propose a new  
3 plan increasing the stream of payments or object to the claim. If  
4 that objection were based upon the value of the collateral,  
5 practicality as well as § 506(a) would require the value to be  
6 determined at the time of the plan confirmation so that the court  
7 could determine compliance with § 1325(a)(5)(B). However, so long  
8 as the payment stream under a proposed plan is sufficient to meet  
9 the requirements of § 1325(a)(5)(B) based on the claims as filed,  
10 confirmation may occur.

11 No provision of the Code, including § 506(a), imposes a  
12 deadline for the filing of objections to claims. The question then  
13 becomes whether under the facts of this case, laches, estoppel or  
14 some other equitable doctrine precludes the debtor from now  
15 objecting to Ford's Proof of Claim.

16 Ford argues that the doctrine of laches or equitable estoppel  
17 precludes this debtor from objecting to the claim 5 months after  
18 confirmation. Ford also argues that as the debtor listed the value  
19 of the collateral at \$16,500 in her first proposed plan and then in  
20 the confirmed plan at \$15,000, the debtor should now be equitably  
21 estopped from alleging a lower value. Ford has the burden of proof  
22 on this affirmative defense and must present clear and convincing  
23 evidence. *Central Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. United States*,  
24 32 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Ariz. 1998).

25 In order to prevail, Ford must demonstrate that the debtor  
26 intended Ford to take some action (alternatively, to fail to take  
27 some action which it otherwise could have taken) based upon the  
28 valuation contained in the plan. Also, Ford must have relied upon

1 the valuation reference in the plan to its injury. *Cedar Creek Oil*  
2 *& Gas Co. v. Fidelity Gas Co.*, 249 F.2d 277 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1957) and  
3 *Central Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. United States*, *supra*.  
4 Ford has presented no evidence that either of these conditions  
5 occurred. Ford had filed a Proof of Claim alleging a secured claim  
6 of \$23,004.28 which was prima facie evidence of the claim's  
7 validity and amount. It created a rebuttable presumption that Ford  
8 has an allowed secured claim of that amount. *In re Garner*, *supra*.  
9 The claim was deemed allowed under § 502(a). Under these  
10 principles of bankruptcy law, it is difficult to perceive how Ford  
11 could have relied upon the value referenced in the plan as  
12 determining its right to an allowed secured claim.

13 Ford argues that the doctrine of laches precludes the debtor  
14 from delaying for 5 months after confirmation to object to the  
15 filed claim.

16 Laches is an equitable doctrine. Its application depends  
17 upon the facts of the particular case. (Cases cited).  
18 To establish laches the defendant must show both an  
unexcused or unreasonable delay by the plaintiff and  
prejudice to himself.

19 *Brown v. Continental Can Co.*, 765 F.2d 810 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985).

20 This doctrine is applicable in bankruptcy proceedings. *In re*  
21 *Petty*, 93 B.R. 208 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. BAP 1988).

22 When Ford filed its Proof of Claim on July 1, 1998 alleging  
23 that it was fully secured in the amount of \$23,004.28, the debtor  
24 had all the facts available to determine if an objection to claim  
25 should be filed based on § 506(a). The debtor had possession of  
26 the collateral and had an opinion of its value as of the date of  
27 the filing of the petition which in fact she expressed in her  
28 original plan when she listed the value as \$16,500. The propriety

1 of the claim, although not based on § 506(a), was raised by the  
2 Trustee in his objection to confirmation of the original plan.  
3 When the debtor filed her Second Amended Plan, she listed the value  
4 of the vehicle at \$15,000, again evidencing that she knew she had  
5 a basis to dispute the filed claim. The pleadings themselves  
6 demonstrate that the debtor knew she had a dispute with Ford  
7 concerning the value of the vehicle, yet the debtor did not object  
8 to the claim.

9       Although the value of the collateral is to be established as  
10 of the date of the filing of the petition, automobiles by their  
11 very nature deteriorate rather quickly and can suffer a significant  
12 change in condition very rapidly and unexpectedly. Mileage  
13 continues to increase. The more time that passes between the  
14 commencement of the case and any objection to claim based on the  
15 value of a vehicle, the more difficult is it for a creditor to  
16 establish to its own satisfaction, let alone prove to the court,  
17 the condition and value of the vehicle as of the date of filing.

18       Automobile lien creditors will in most cases be prejudiced  
19 when many months pass between the commencement of the Chapter 13  
20 and the filing of an objection to claim under § 506(a). Assuming  
21 without deciding that is true in this case, this does not  
22 automatically result in the doctrine of laches being applied. The  
23 doctrine not only requires prejudice to the creditor but requires  
24 "inexcusable" or "unreasonable" delay on the part of the debtor in  
25 the filing of an objection to claim.

26       The delay in this case was caused in great part by the change  
27 of counsel for the debtor. Through no fault of the debtor or her  
28 counsel, the debtor was required after plan confirmation to obtain

1 new counsel. That new counsel had to familiarize himself with the  
2 case. Absent that circumstance and assuming prejudice to Ford as  
3 outlined above, laches would prevent the debtor now raising an  
4 objection to Ford's claim. However, the court finds that the 5  
5 months of delay between the plan confirmation and the filing of the  
6 objection to claim is excused due to the circumstances surrounding  
7 the required change of counsel.


8 IV.

9 CONCLUSION

10 Confirmation of the plan did not operate as *res judicata* as to  
11 the amount of Ford's allowed secured claim. The doctrine of laches  
12 does not render the delay in filing the objection to Ford's Proof  
13 of Claim untimely, assuming Ford was prejudiced by the delay, as  
14 the delay is excusable due to the circumstances surrounding the  
15 change of counsel.

16 The Clerk of the Court is directed to file this Memorandum  
17 Decision and provide copies to counsel.

18 DATED this 15<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2000.

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20   
21 PATRICIA C. WILLIAMS, Bankruptcy Judge  
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